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Recent Developments
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-EFFECT OF EQUAL RIGHTS AMEND-
MENT ON CHILD CUSTODY DECISIONS. Md. Const., Declaration of
Rights art. 46.
Until election day in November, 1972, the fundamental principle
regarding child custody in Maryland divorce proceedings appeared to be
well settled: a non-adulterous mother was a preferred custodian to the
father.' On that day, however, the electorate ratified the Equal Rights
Amendment' to the Maryland Constitution, which stated, in essence,
that "[el quality of rights under the law shall not be abridged or denied
because of sex."3 The Maryland Court of Appeals will now have to
measure the impact this will have, inter alia, on child custody
proceedings.
There would have been little problem in making this determination
had the United States Supreme Court, in Reed v. Reed,4 resolved that
sex-based classifications were "suspect" under the fourteenth amend-
ment. However, since it did not, and since the federal ERA is presently
in danger of either being defeated or growing irretrievably stale in
legislative pigeonholes,' the Maryland Court of Appeals will not be
afforded the luxury of looking to the United States Supreme Court for
guidance in the near future.
The problem is compounded further by the fact that there is no
legislative history behind the Maryland amendment,6 as Maryland
House Bill 687 (the proposal actually ratified by the Maryland
electorate) simply adopted what is termed the "standard version" 7 of
the equal rights legislation. However, inasmuch as the Maryland
amendment is essentially identical to the federal proposal,8 the
1. Cornwell v. Cornwell, 244 Md. 674, 224 A.2d 870 (1966); Palmer v. Palmer, 238 Md. 327,
207 A.2d 481 (1965); Glick v. Glick, 232 Md. 244, 192 A.2d 791 (1963); Townsend v.
Townsend, 205 Md. 591, 109 A.2d 765 (1954).
2. The Equal Rights Amendment will hereinafter be referred to as the ERA.
3. MD. CONST., DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. 46, § 1. Section 2 merely provides for the refer-
endum. Act of May 26, 1972, ch. 366, [1972] Laws of Md. 1225.
4. 404 U.S. 71 (1971); see Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961); Williams v. McNair, 316 F.
Supp. 134 (D.S.C. 1970), affd mem., 401 U.S. 951 (1971). See also Bayh, The Need
for the Equal Rights Amendment, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 80, 87 (1972).
5. Washington Post, Feb. 7, 1973, § A at 1, col. 3. Twenty-one of the twenty-three states
ratifying the amendment by January 1973 did so within six months after March 22, 1972,
the date it passed the Congress.
6. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, MEMORANDUM TO MARYLAND COM-
MISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, LIST OF SECTIONS OF MARYLAND ANNOTATED CODE
WHICH MAY BE AFFECTED By THE ADOPTION OF THE PROPOSED EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT
TO THE UNITED STATES AND MARYLAND CONSTITUTIONS 5 (Sept. 19, 1972).
7. Martin, Equal Rights Amendment: Legislative Background, 11 J. FAM. L. 363, 372
n.26 (1971). For no apparent reason, Maryland's version has reversed the order of
"abridged" and "denied."
8. The following comparison is offered to show the substantive identity of the two:
Federal, § 1: "Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any state on account of sex." 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 835. H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (Oct. 12, 1971) and S.J. Res. 8,
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legislative history of the federal amendment is therefore 'directly
applicable to the Maryland enactment.
The effect of the ERA on child custody cases turns on two
questions: 1) whether Congress intended current "protective" laws to
coexist with, or be destroyed by, the ERA; and 2) whether Congress
intended there to be any exceptions to an absolute ban on legislative or
common law sex-based classifications.
As to the first question, it is clear beyond any doubt that Congress
intended the ERA to be destructive of any special legal protection of
women. This is seen from the fact that three of the four major
campaigns for passage of the ERA were defeated by the chaotic debate
caused by proposed riders thereto which provided that "this article
shall not be construed to impair any rights, benefits, or exemp-
tions... conferred by law upon persons of the female sex." 9 Further,
when the federal ERA did finally pass the Congress, it was in the wake
of an 82 to 9 rejection of Senator Sam Ervin's similarly protective
rider.' 0
Thus it is clear that, not only was Congress acutely aware of the
conflict between protective legislation and the ERA, but moreover that
it expressly and overwhelmingly rejected an attempt to save that
protection. The conclusion is accordingly inescapable that any
common-law or statutory presumption 1' favoring the female parent is
void to the full extent that it is based on an impermissible sexual
distinction, the second of the determinative questions.
The commentators on the sex-based classification problem all appear
to adhere to the rule that no classification is to be made on the basis of
generally-accepted-as-true sexual stereotypes. Ruth B. Ginsburg, a
leader of the Women's Liberation movement and a professor of law at
Rutgers University, states, "With few exceptions relating to personal
92d Cong., 2d Sess. (Mar. 22, 1972) are the resolutions enacted by the respective
Houses of Congress.
Maryland, sec. 1: "Equality of rights under the law shall not be abridged or denied
because of sex." MD. CONST., DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. 46, § 1, Act of
May 26, 1972, ch. 366, [1972] Laws of Md. 1225.
Section 2 of the federal ERA provides for Congressional enforcement of § 1, and § 3
allows for a two-year delay before the amendment takes effect (unlike its Maryland
counterpart).
9. 96 CONG. REC. 870 (1950). See also 99 CONG. REC. 8973 (1953); 116 CONG. REC.
36,300 (1970).
10. 118 CONG. REC. 4554 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1972).
11. The judicial branch being as fully an arm of the government as is the legislative, it must
follow that common law, or judicially-created, special protections are as impermis-
sible as statutory ones. Brown, Emerson. Falk & Freedman. The Equal Rights Amend-
ment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights For Women, 80 YALE L. J. 871, 953
(1971) (quoted in text accompanying note 24 infra) [hereinafter cited as Brown]; Com-
ment, The Effect of the Equal Rights Amendment on Kentucky's Domestic Relations
Laws, 12 J. FAM. L. 151, 152-53 (1972); Note, The "Equal Rights" Amendment-Pos-
itive Panacea or Negative Nostrum?, 59. Ky. L. J. 953, 982 (1971).
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privacy and physical characteristics unique to one sex, the constitu-
tional mandate would be absolute if the [equal rights] amendment is
adopted.' 2
An extensive Yale article on this subject' 3 is in accord with the
above view, and gives, by way of example, wet-nursing and sperm banks
as proper subjects for the physical-difference theory of differentia-
tion,' and includes bathrooms, living quarters, and police searches as
proper subjects for the (Griswold v. Connecticut' 5-oriented) privacy
theory.'6 Declaring that, "In short, sex is a prohibited classifica-
tion,"' ' this article explained that: "the constitutional mandate must
be absolute. The issue under the Equal Rights Amendment cannot be
different but equal, reasonable or unreasonable classification, suspect
classification, fundamental interest, or the demands of administrative
expediency. Equality of rights means that sex is not a factor."' '
A pre-Reed article in this same area summarized the problem aptly
when the author characterized sex-based classifications as "simply a
matter of traditional notions concerning sexual roles and capabilities,"
then called for "more realistic" distinctions." 9 Although this article
also called for application of the Shapiro v. Thompson 0 strict scrutiny
test rejected by the Supreme Court in Reed, it made a persuasive
argument therefor:
Most sex-based classifications, in contrast, are, like racial
classifications, the result of long standing professional decisions
concerning the abilities or worth of a group. Neither latitude for
local legislative experimentation nor considerations of financial
resources are involved. Justification must rest on a factual
finding that one sex, as a class, possesses distinct abilities, needs,
and life style which differentiate itself to a sufficient degree
that a legislature can reasonably be said to be classifying on the
basis of natural group attributes. 2 '
12. Speech by Ruth B. Ginsburg, Southern Regional Conference of the National Conference
of Law Women, Oct. 1, 1971, in Sex and Unequal Protection: Men and Women as
Victims, 11 J. FAM. L. 347, 361 (1971) (footnote omitted).
13. Brown, supra note 11.
14. Id. at 893. Accord, Bayh, The Need for the Equal Rights Amendment, 48 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 80, 81 (1972); Eastwood, The Double Standard of Justice: Women's Rights Under
the Constitution, 5 VALPARAISO U. L. REV. 281 (1971); Emerson, In Support of the
Equal Rights Amendment, 6 HARV. Cwv. RIGHTS-Civ. LIB. L. REV. 225 (1971); Speech by
Ruth B. Ginsburg, supra note 12.
15. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
16. Brown 901.
17. Id. at 889.
18. Id. at 892.
19. Comment, Are Sex-Based Classifications Constitutionally Suspect?. 66 Nw. U.L. REV.
481, 501 (1971).
20. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
21. Comment, supra note 19, at 498.
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Turning now to the impact of the foregoing on child-custody law, it
is apparent that the presumption that a mother should have the
children is a classic sexual stereotype in that, generally, non-adulterous
mothers are assumed to be the ones who should keep the house and
raise the children rather than the bread-winning fathers:2 2 this is
exactly what the ERA has outlawed.3 Certainly, whatever reasonable
standards or elements the courts will formulate in determining the
preferred parent for custody cannot conceivably qualify under the
privacy exception. Further, the only sex-based preference which could
possibly withstand the unique-physical-difference test would be perhaps
one based on breast-feeding, which, of course, is so ephemeral in nature
as to require only interlocutory treatment in any case.
The Yale article addressed this subject directly:
In most states there is no statute favoring one parent or the
other; rather, preference for the mother or father exists as a
result of judicially created presumptions in favor of the mother
for girls and young children and in favor of the father for older
boys.
The Equal Rights Amendment would prohibit both statutory
and common law presumptions about which parent was the
proper guardian based on the sex of the parent.2"
Similar sentiments are expressed in numerous other sources2 s on the
subject, and there does not appear to be a shred of authority at serious
variance with that set out above.2 6
Finally, there remains the question of what considerations should
guide the court in making custody determinations in light of the ERA.
Of course, the central concern of the entire problem is already deeply
entrenched in the law: the best interests of the child.2 ' Unfortunately,
22. Dorsen & Ross, The Necessity of a Constitutional Amendment, 6 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-
UL. L. REV. 215, 221 (1971); Eastwood, supra note 14, at 285; Kurland, The Equal Rights
Amendment: Some Problems of Construction, 6 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIv. LIB. L. REV.
243, 248 (1971); Comment, "A Little Dearer Than His Horse": Legal Stereotypes and
the Feminine Personality, 6 HARV. Civ. .RIGHTS-CIv. LIB. L. REV. 260 (1971).
23. "Sex is an impermissible category by which to determine ... the custody of child-
ren .... Emerson, supra note 14, at 225. Bayh, The Equal Rights Amendment, 6
IND. L. REV. 1, 17 (1972); Brown 953; Eastwood, supra note 14, at 303; Sedler, The Legal
Dimensions of Women's Liberation: An Overview, 47 IND. L. J. 419, 432 (1972); Note,
,upra note 11, at 982.
24. Brown 953 (footnote omitted).
25. See generally sources cited notes 14 and 23 supra.
26. Depending on the construction given to one statement of the author, a contrary view may
have been set forth in Weaver, The Equal Rights Amendment, Part III-The Practical
Effects, 57 WOMEN LAW. J. 17, 19 (1971); however, Ms. Weaver cited no authority.
27. E.g., Mullinix v. Mullinix, 12 Md. App. 402, 409, 278 A.2d 674, 678 (1971); DeGrange v.
Kline, 254 Md. 240, 243, 254 A.2d 353, 354 (1969); Ouellette v. Ouellette, 246 Md. 604,




the component considerations of that vague phrase have been so
dwarfed by the pro-motherhood presumption as to defy cogent
analysis;2" however, some standards have been suggested,2 9 and, of
course, case law will indicate to some extent the legal acceptability of
these various tests.
Further, in view of the fact that the ERA will undoubtedly multiply
custody litigation in the future, there are certain forensic practicalities
which must now be integrated into custody proceedings in order to
avoid perjurious cross-accusations by the competing parents, the calling
of twenty bishops by each side to testify as to parental acumen and
ability, and the "snatching" of children at the outset of the marital
dissolution so as to invoke the judicial presumption against a change in
custody."0 With an eye to the above, the following tests are suggested,
in the relative order of their importance:
1) Desire, vel non, of each parent to raise the child.3 ' This rule
simply dictates that a child should not be awarded to a
parent who does not wish to raise it, in the face of an
expression of a contrary desire on the part of the other
parent.
2) Parental background (fitness). Due largely to the practical
considerations set out above, fitness can be determined
greatly on the basis of external standards, and the
credibility of the witnesses. These external standards
include:
a) corroborated and substantiated evidence of unfit-
ness,32
28. "The assumption that the mother is a better custodian was and is wrong from an his-
torical, economic, sociological, and philosophical point of view." Podell, Peck & First,
Custody-To Which Parent? 56 MARQ. L. REV. 51, 53 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Podell]. As to the amount of actual discrimination in practice at the trial level, see
note 43 infra. As to the proposition that the mother is the preferred custodian in
Maryland, see Oberlander v. Oberlander, 256 Md. 672, 676, 261 A.2d 727, 729 (1970);
Kauten v. Kauten, 257 Md. 10, 11, 261 A.2d 759, 760 (1970); Glick v. Glick, 232 Md. 244,
248, 192 A.2d 791, 794 (1963). "[T~he mother is the natural custodian of her young."
(emphasis added). Cornwell v. Cornwell, 244 Md. 674, 678, 224 A.2d 870, 873-(1966).
29. See, e.g., UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 402 (1970) [hereinafter cited as UNIFORM
ACT]; Foster, Adoption and Custody: Best Interests of the Child?, 22 BUFFALO L.
REV. 1 (1972); Podell, supra note 28; Note, Paternal Custody of Minor Children in
Idaho, 8 IDAHO L. REV. 345, 353 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Notel.
30. The courts have drawn criticism for making custody decisions without the recommenda-
tions of a social agency or assistance from psychologists, psychiatrists, social investiga-
tors, etc. See sources cited note 29 supra.
31. UNIFORM ACT § 402 (1); Note 353, § A. See Dietrich v. Anderson, 185 Md. 103,
43 A.2d 186 (1945); Ross v. Pick, 199 Md. 341, 86 A.2d 463 (1952).
32. To avoid the twenty-bishops problem as well as the perjurious-accusations problem, the
court should presume both parents to be perfectly fit to raise the children, and allow any
corroborated evidence of unfitness to rebut that presumption. Accord, Note 353, § D.
See generally Ferster v. Ferster, 237 Md. 548, 207 A.2d 96 (1965); Wirth v. Wirth, 192
Md. 21, 63 A.2d 312 (1949); Cockerham v. Children's Aid Society of Cecil County, 185
Md. 97, 43 A.2d 197 (1945).
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b) the health of each parent,3
c) the education, training, and background of each
parent,
d) the moral fiber of each parent, including traditional
tests as to crimes of moral turpitude, adulterous
behavior, unkempt personal habits, etc.,3 4
e) mental stability and temperament of each parent
(the "fault" of the divorce could be considered here
to the extent that it indicates irresponsibility,
instability, etc.),3 I and
f) availability of each parent to raise the child (time at
home).3 6
3) Wishes of the children. This should be weighed in
accordance with the child's age and maturity, the strength
of the child's preference, and whether this will result in a
split custody situation.3
4) Standard of living.3" This rule would give some preference
to that parent best able to provide for the child, and would
require consideration of both present and future earning
power and/or access to financial resources.
5) Disruption caused by custody change.3 9 This criterion
would indicate that custody, once determined properly,
should not be changed except for substantial alterations in
the circumstances of the parties. This rule would be
absolutely inapplicable as to custody achieved through the
extra-judicial seizure of the children at the original
separation of the parties, or through an award pendente lite
(which is, of course, based on the barest of judicial
inquiries), inasmuch as the former discourages any tem-
porary agreement which the parties may make for the
benefit of the children, and the latter would tend to
perpetuate any original mistake for the sole reason that the
mistake was already in existence.
33. UNIFORM ACT § 402 (5); Note 353, § B; but cf. Palmer v. Palmer 238 Md. 327, 207 A.2d
481 (1965).
34. UNIFORM ACT § 402 (5); Note 353, § F; Ferster v. Ferster, 237 Md. 548, 207 A.2d 96
(1965); Cockerham v. Children's Aid Society of Cecil County, 185 Md. 97, 43 A.2d 197
(1945).
35. UNIFORM ACT § 402 (5); Podell 61-63; Note 353, § B; Bryce v. Bryce, 229 Md. 16,
181 A.2d 455 (1962); Hild v. Hild, 221 Md. 349, 157 A.2d 442 (1960).
36. Podell 65; Butler v. Perry, 210 Md. 332, 123 A.2d 453 (1956).
37. UNIFORM ACT § 402 (2); Podell 57; Zell v. Zell, 12 Md. App. 563, 280 A.2d 22 (1971);
Parker v. Parker, 222 Md. 69, 158 A.2d 607 (1960); Trenton v. Christ, 216 Md. 418, 140
A.2d 660 (1958).
38. Podell 64; Note 353, § C; Daubert v. Daubert, 239 Md. 303, 211 A.2d 323 (1965); Ross v.
Pick, 199 Md. 341, 86 A.2d 463, (1952); Dietrich v. Anderson, 185 Md. 103, 43 A.2d 186
(1945).
39. UNIFORM ACT § 402 (4); Lippy v. Breidenstein, 249 Md. 415, 240 A.2d 251 (1968);
Trenton v. Christ, 216 Md. 418, 140 A.2d 660 (1958).
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6) Compatibility of the interests of parent and child.4 ° This
rule contemplates that some consideration should be given
to the parent most willing and able to develop the child's
natural ambitions and propensities; it essentially allows
sex-based distinctions to the extent that the individual
parent and child comply with the traditional sexual
stereotypes, if at all. Since it is an individual evaluation in
each case, it would not therefore run afoul of the ERA. 4 '
CONCLUSION
In ratifying the ERA, the Maryland electorate has delivered a
mandate to its government which, in the case of child-custody matters,
demands that there be no discrimination on the basis of sex, be it de
jure or de facto. The presumption that the non-adulterous mother
should have the children has not thereby been merely neutrally ended,
it has been made affirmatively illegal. 4 2 Accordingly, the Maryland
Court of Appeals should not merely redefine and realign its standards as
to child custody, it should further demand that the de facto
discrimination heretofore practiced4" be immediately ended.
4 4 "The
judicial role must transcend social conditioning .... ,
40. UNIFORM Acr § 402 (3); Podell 64; Note 353, § A; Cornwell v. Cornwell, 244 Md. 674,
224 A.2d 870, (1966); Alden v. Alden, 226 Md. 622, 174 A.2d 793 (1961); Sewell v. Sewell,
218 Md. 63, 145 A.2d 422 (1958).
41. Accord, Barnard, The Conflict Between State Protective Legislation and Federal Laws
Prohibiting Sex Discrimination: Is It Resolved?, 17 WAYNE L. REV. 25, 63 (1971);
Brown 953; Emerson, supra note 14.
42. Emerson, supra note 14, at 229.
43. "The discrimination is apparent in these cases .... Note, supra note 11, at 982. The
sources vary on the actual percentage of time the mother is awarded custody at the trial
level: 95%, Nagel & Weitzman, Women as Litigants, 23 HASTINGS L. J. 171, 189 n.47
(1971); 90%, Brown 953 n. 99; approximately 94% is admitted to by a trial judge in Hatten
& Brown, The Impressions of a Domestic Relations Judge, 13 S. TEX. L. J. 250, 259
(1972). This is in the face of many jurisdictions having a statute prohibiting this discrimi-
nation as to custody. Brown 953. See note 28 supra and sources cited therein.
44. "[A] constitutional amendment ... will compel the Supreme Court to adopt a standard
of active review in evaluating classifications based on sex." (emphasis added). Comment,
Sex Discrimination and Equal Protection: Do We Need a Constitutional Amend-
ment?, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1499, 1524 (1971). "A judge whose opinions on important ques-
tions of public policy reflect nothing more than his private estimate of public majority
opinion is engaging in journalism, not jurisprudence." Johnston & Knapp, Sex Discrimi-
nation By Law: A Study in Judicial Perspective, 46 N.Y.U.L. REV. 675, 747 (1971).
45. Johnston, supra note 44, as 747.
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